University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Public Policy Initiative Issue Briefs

Wharton Public Policy Initiative

12-2017

Why Taxing Carbon May Not Make the World More Green
Serguei Netessine
University of Pennsylvania

Sam Aflaki

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Economic Policy Commons,
Environmental Policy Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Netessine, Serguei and Aflaki, Sam, "Why Taxing Carbon May Not Make the World More Green" (2017).
Wharton Public Policy Initiative Issue Briefs. 50.
https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/50

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/50
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Why Taxing Carbon May Not Make the World More Green
Summary
Although taxing carbon is an idea that enjoys significant support among policymakers and business
leaders, new research indicates that carbon taxation can actually cause energy investments to gravitate
away from the cleanest energy technologies. This counterintuitive finding reflects two key characteristics
of energy markets: the worldwide increase in renewable energy sources whose output is intermittent and
variable; and greater market liberalization, which has made the spot driving of electricity more volatile.
The intermittency of renewable energy sources requires backup generation, typically from generators
using fossil fuels. The dynamics of market liberalization amplify this negative effect of intermittency.
Policymakers need to take steps to reduce intermittency by supporting storage technologies or setting
monetary incentives to increase renewable generation capacity investment.
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There is an important yet largely overlooked link between the intermittent
accessibility of renewable energy sources and the effectiveness of renewablepromoting policies such as carbon pricing.
Putting a price on carbon is sometimes discussed in
terms of a “tax,” but a carbon tax is not necessarily
the same as a traditional tax, as the primary purpose
is not to raise revenue but rather to reduce emissions.
A variety of proposals exist that would introduce
a revenue-neutral carbon tax in the U.S., with disparities, of course, in the price itself and on how the
revenue generated from the tax should be spent.1 But
as a general topic of public policy, taxing carbon enjoys
the support of some strange political bedfellows, from
most Democrats and economists to nearly half of all
Republicans and over 1,200 multinational corporations, including the United States’ own Exxon Mobil.2
Over 140 global companies, including Microsoft and
Cummins, already embed a carbon price deep within
their business strategies and operations without any
legal mandate to do so.3 While the Trump Administration has repeatedly denied that it will consider a
carbon tax as part of its tax reform agenda, there is an
important, new consideration about which policymakers should be aware, should the topic arise.
We have discovered through our research a surprising, non-intuitive result concerning the effects of a
carbon tax.4 When the price of carbon rises, investment in (greenhouse gas-free) renewable energy technology does become comparatively cheaper, but most

SUMMARY
• Although taxing carbon is an idea that enjoys significant support among policymakers and business leaders, new research
indicates that carbon taxation can actually cause energy investments to gravitate away from the cleanest energy technologies.
• This counterintuitive finding reflects two key characteristics
about energy markets: the worldwide increase in renewable
energy sources whose output is intermittent and variable; and
greater market liberalization, which has made the spot pricing of
electricity more volatile. The intermittency of renewable energy
sources requires backup generation, typically from generators
using fossil fuels. The dynamics of market liberalization amplify
this negative effect of intermittency.
• Long-term fixed price contracts with electricity suppliers can
help address the risk of volatile spot prices and encourage
investment in renewables, but the intermittency problem will
still force suppliers to employ emission-intensive generators
for backup, and thus will fail to significantly abate emissions.
• Policymakers therefore also need to take steps to reduce intermittency by supporting the development of electricity storage technologies or setting monetary incentives to increase
renewable generation capacity investment.
• The price effects of market liberalization and the problem of
intermittency must be addressed in concert, in order for carbon
taxation to more effectively promote investment in renewables
and reduce overall emissions.
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new capacity investment actually goes
toward newer, more efficient (yet still
GHG-emitting) gas-fired turbines.
The reason is that, under the status
quo, renewables remain chained to
the heaviest GHG-emitting generators (see Figure 1). These fossil fuel
sources—comprised predominantly of
old, inefficient gas-fired turbines—are
often the only generators that can
quickly be brought online by electricity suppliers to provide the necessary
supply of energy when renewables
are unable to meet energy demand.
This dependence on emission-heavy
reserves is a practical consequence
of the intermittency of green energy
sources and of renewable generators’
inability to store excess power. When
carbon prices go up, the combination
of renewables and emission-heavy
reserves becomes too expensive relative to efficient gas-fired technologies.
Ultimately, this leads the majority
of uncoordinated investments made
in the liberalized energy marketplace
to gravitate away from the cleanest
technology.
Before delving into potential policy
responses to the problem of GHG
emissions in light of this new finding,
a clear understanding of energy markets is essential. To begin with, not one
but two monumental developments

have recently reshaped electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and
retailing: the introduction of renewables and market liberalization.

and electricity generation from solar
panels is volatile because of their sensitivity to weather conditions, air pollution, and other determinants of solar
radiation intensity. Although some of
this variability in supply is natural and
can be planned for (e.g., the lack of
generation from solar panels at night),
there is still significant uncertainty
associated with the outputs of renewable technologies.
Investment in the capacity to generate renewable energy is hampered
not only by intermittency but also by
the high costs involved. A variety of
strategies have been adopted to incen-

THE INTRODUCTION OF
RENEWABLES
The worldwide increase in capacity
installations for renewable sources of
energy, such as wind and solar power,
has been accelerating. In the last
decade, wind capacity installations
have increased tenfold. China has
the greatest installed capacity in the
world, followed by the United States,
FIGURE 1 GENERATION TECHNOLOGY
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Germany, Spain, and India.5 But a
critical aspect of renewable technologies is their intermittency—that is,
the supply of electricity from these
sources is typically uncertain. For
instance, wind blows neither continuously nor in concert with demand,

tivize investment in renewables. These
strategies include establishing renewable portfolio standards, minimum
prices for renewable energy injected
into the grid (i.e., renewable feed-in
tariffs), and multiyear subsidies and
investment credits in some jurisdictions

NOTES
Kotchen M, Turk Z, and Leiserowitz A (2017), “Public
willingness to pay for a US carbon tax and preferences
for spending the revenue,” Environmental Research Letters, 12:9. Available at: http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa822a.
2 CDP, Global Carbon Price Report 2016 , available at:
https://www.cdp.net/en/research; and Alexander Kaufman,
“Americans Are Willing to Pay a Carbon Tax, But Trump
Won’t Even Consider It,” Huffington Post, October 12,
2017.
3 CDP, supra note 2; and Light S (2015), “Not the Only Game
1

in Town: The Complementary Roles of Public and Private
Environmental Governance,” Penn Wharton Public Policy
Initiative, Issue Brief: Volume 3, No. 8.
4 The research in this Issue Brief is based on Aflaki S and Netessine S (2017), “Strategic Investment in Renewable Energy Sources: The Effect of Supply Intermittency,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 19(3):489-507.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0621.
5 Ren21 (2014), Renewables 2014 Global Status Report,
REN21 Secretariat, Paris.
6 For a critical review of various incentives for renewable en-
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ergy investments, see Bushnell J (2010), “Building blocks:
Investment in renewable and non-renewable technologies,”
Moselle B, Padilla J, Schmalensee R, eds., Harnessing
Renewable Energy in Electric Power Systems: Theory,
Practice, Policy (Earthscan, Washington, DC), pp. 159–180.
7 Proposals for pricing the carbon emissions from fossil-fuel
electricity plants include a carbon tax or a “cap and trade”
system of credits. For a discussion of the various forms of
carbon pricing in the context of technology planning, see
Drake DF, Kleindorfer PR, Van Wassenhove LN (2016),
“Technology choice and capacity portfolios under emis-
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as direct incentives for new renewable
capacity.6 In addition to these direct
incentives for renewable investment,
there can be indirect incentives in the
form of increased prices on fossil-fuel
electricity generation (gas-fired, coal,
etc.) through the penalizing of firms
for technology-induced environmental
damage. The most significant of these
penalties is referred to generically as
carbon pricing.7
We find that increasing the carbon
price has two counteracting effects
on investments in renewables. On the
one hand, it improves the cost competitiveness of renewables relative to
nonrenewable technologies—a result
of the former’s lower greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. On the other hand,
renewables require backup generation,
which typically comes from generators
using fossil fuels; thus, an increase in
the carbon price leads to an increase
in the cost of reserves to cover intermittency. How these countervailing
forces affect the technology share of
renewables in the overall generation
portfolio depends on the carbon price
and also on the emission intensity
of backup generation technologies.
Often it is the older, more emissionintensive technologies that are used
for backup. So in stark contrast to
intuition, increasing the carbon price

may actually reduce the overall proportion of renewable generation.8

power stemming from their historically dominant position. The result is
that market liberalization has rendered
electricity a commodity that can be
traded in wholesale electricity markets.
In a competitive electricity market,
power generators typically submit
their supply offers to the market (grid
or pool) administrator while retailers
(representing their end-use electricity customers) submit their demand
bids. The independent system operator,
responsible to meet all the demand,
then sorts the supply offers from the
lowest to the highest before scheduling dispatch based on the merit
order—subject to transmission (and
other physical) constraints. The efficient dispatch algorithms used in this
process, in combination with the bidding rules, imply that the spot price
of electricity under typical conditions
and in a perfectly competitive market
is determined by the marginal cost of
the last unit of energy dispatched.10
Hence, the spot price, which is
extremely volatile, is determined
by supply and the realized random
demand.11
The problem is that wind generators suffer more under competition
than under vertical integration. The
intuitive explanation for this outcome
is that the incentive of each genera-

MARKET LIBERALIZATION
Besides the introduction of renewable sources, electricity markets have
undergone another important change
in the last two decades: market liberalization. For almost a century, the
electricity sector resembled a natural
monopoly. All four primary elements
of electricity supply—generation,
transmission, distribution, and retailing—were organized as a vertically
integrated firm that was owned either
privately or by the state and with price
and entry regulations identical to
natural monopolies. The logic of this
approach was based on operational
constraints associated with balancing the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electricity. That balancing also contributed to the economics
of electricity generation because it
reduced retailing costs.9 The first step
toward the liberalization of electricity
markets was the “vertical unbundling”
of the industry’s generators and retailers. Such restructuring was motivated
by the desire to create competition
among generators, thereby reducing
retail prices, and to prevent incumbent
utilities from exploiting the market

NOTES
sions regulation,” Production Oper. Management 25(6):
1006–1025.
8 I focus on generation capacity rather than the total monetary investment, which may or may not be higher than that
for the conventional generation source.
9 Michaels RJ (2007), “Vertical integration and the restructuring of the U.S. electricity industry,” Working paper, Cato
Institute Policy Analysis Series, California State University,
Fullerton.
10 Joskow PL (2006), “Competitive electricity markets and
investment in new generating capacity,” Working paper,

Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
11 In practice, not only zero but also negative electricity
prices are possible. That possibility reflects the costliness
of supply adjustment even for renewable generators.
See, e.g.,https://www.epexspot.com/en/company-info/
basics_of_the_power_market/negative_prices.
12 Joskow, supra note 10.
13 Borenstein S (2002), “The trouble with electricity markets:
Under-standing California’s restructuring disaster,” J.
Econom. Perspect. 16(1):191–211.
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Such a bilateral arrangement takes one of two possible
forms (see Borenstein). In an electricity pool, or marketbased bilateral contracts, all generators sell to a pool run
by an independent sys- tem operator and all suppliers buy
from that pool. In this case, the ISO manages the physical
feasibility of electricity flow within the network. An alternative is for buyers and sellers to make their own arrangements for the purchase of electricity and then to inform
the system operator about those arrangements. Here the
system operator steps in only if some physical infeasibility
might otherwise occur—as when a part of the transmis-
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tor to underinvest in the competition
scenario depends not only on its unit
total cost but also on the market price.
A higher carbon price increases the
unit cost of gas-generated electricity,
which under competition creates a
disincentive for the gas generator to
invest. Similarly, the intermittency of
wind generation creates a disincentive
for the wind generator to invest under
competition. The reason is that the
spot price of electricity is decreasing
in the availability of wind capacity;
this puts wind at a significant competitive disadvantage because the price
is lowest when wind is available and is
highest when wind is not available. In
short, the spot-price disadvantage of
wind dominates. As the carbon price
rises, this disadvantage is balanced by
the emission disadvantage of the gas
technology, which decreases the gas
generator’s incentive to invest, because
higher investment pushes the spot
price down and results in less revenue.
A principal takeaway from the
development of liberalized markets,
therefore, is that the negative effect
of intermittency is amplified by the
marginal-cost pricing that is typical
of such markets. This finding offers
novel support for the hypothesis that
market liberalization—over and above
intermittency—leads to underinvest-

ment in renewable electric generation
capacity.12

POLICY RESPONSES
To counter the disincentives to invest
in renewables in a liberalized market, public policy experts suggest
long-term fixed-price contracts with
generators so that investment in new
generating capacity will be protected
from the risk of volatile spot prices.13
For instance, long-term contracts
involving wind developers, electricity suppliers, and large customers are
used in the United States and Europe
to promote investment in renewable
capacity. Such fixed-price contracts
with renewable generators are typically benchmarked on feed-in tariffs,
often with regulatory guarantees,
that specify long-term prices based
on generation costs rather than spot
prices. Using numerical experiments
with real-world data, we find that
fixed-price contracts are effective at
stimulating investment in renewables
in a liberalized market. However,
overreliance on carbon-intensive
backup generation may significantly
lessen the environmental benefits
of using renewables relative to the
hypothetical case in which firms are
vertically integrated.

NOTES
sion grid is overloaded. In that case, the ISO sets grid usage
charges to balance the network.
15 Wilson NE, Newell RG, Burtraw D (2005), The Effect of
Long-Term Generation Contracts on Valuation of Electricity
Generating Assets Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (Resources for the Future, Washington, DC).
16 Of course, these statements hold only for relatively high
shares of renewable electricity generation capacity, for
which emission-free backup generation (such as hydropower) does not exist.
17 See, e.g., Wu OQ, Kapuscinski R (2013), “Curtailing inter-

mittent generation in electrical systems,” Manufacturing &
Service Oper. Management 15(4):578–595.
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FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS
Given the volatility of spot prices,
bilateral forward contracts between
suppliers and generators play a significant role in almost all electricity
markets today.14 The time horizon of
the forward contracts can range from
a single day to 15-20 years. In the
United States, long-term forward contracts have been advocated as a means
to promote investment in renewable
generation capacity and to “spur the
growth of renewable generation.”15 In
a number of states (including Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey,
and Delaware), the legal instruments
are already in place to sign long-term
power purchase agreements with fixed
prices and with contracting horizons
of 10-25 years. Germany and Spain,
the two European countries with
highest installed capacity for renewable energy, have used long-term
fixed-price contracts to promote
renewable energy investments.
In the case of unbridled market
competition, fixed-price contracts
increase the installed wind capacity
and decrease the gas capacity. This is
because the wind generator now has
the clear advantage of no uncertainty
in prices. Somewhat surprisingly,
however, there is little difference in gas
capacity investment between the fixed-
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price contracting and market competition scenarios.
These contracts are a viable means
of compensating for the disadvantages of market liberalization from the
standpoints of total cost and greenness.
Yet they could also lead to dramatic
overinvestment in renewables and
underinvestment in gas generation
(relative to vertical integration) for
high enough carbon prices. The likely
result would be an overreliance on the
emission-heavy backup (coal-fired)
generators, given the total absence of
workable and scalable solutions for
storing unutilized renewable energy.
Besides degrading the environment,
that outcome could also lead to gridbalancing issues—should the need
arise for significant backup generation.
To put this another way, although
the overall increase in wind capacity
under a regime of fixed-price contracts
is good news, there is no free lunch:
the increase in wind and total capacity
is such that emissions in this setting
remain higher than under vertical
integration. The installed gas capacity
in this case is insufficient to provide
backup for the intermittent wind
capacity, forcing the supplier to employ
the emission-intensive backup option.
In short, fixed-price contracts are successful at promoting renewables but
fail to significantly abate emissions.16
REDUCING INTERMITTENCY ITSELF
The intermittency of renewable energy
sources is a problematic feature that
handicaps investment decisions in
these technologies. It then follows
that a more effective approach to
increasing capacity investment in
renewables would be to reduce the
effect of intermittency itself. Reduc-

ing intermittency would increase the
effectiveness of carbon pricing as a
green-promoting strategy because not
only would it eliminate that pricing’s
burden on renewables (since there
would then be less need for a backup
technology), but it would also ameliorate renewables’ spot-price disadvantage in electricity markets.
There are various options for
reducing the intermittency of renewables. The first of these is electricity
storage, for which various (relatively
new) technologies are available, albeit
in prototype form mostly. These
technologies include pumped-storage
hydropower, which stores electricity in the form of potential energy,
and pumped-heat electricity storage,
which uses argon gas to store power
in the form of heat. And Tesla has
developed the first potentially scalable form of renewable energy storage
in the form of a battery that retains
excess solar power for use in individual homes. But these technologies
have a long way to go and will require
significant investment before they can
begin to noticeably reduce the intermittency prevalent in the status quo.
Other options besides storage
include the “curtailing” of intermittent generation17 and the pooling of
multiple generation units (possibly
with different technologies) whose
supply is not perfectly correlated.
This latter approach may be possible only for large generators with
enough resources to invest in multiple
wind farms in different (strategically
located) geographical regions. So even
though there are no economies of
scale in wind electricity generation,
there are clear statistical economies
of scale in terms of reduced intermit5

tency. As of yet, however, there has
been no concerted effort to pool technologies to reduce intermittency.
Policymakers can aid the curtailing
of intermittency by offering additional
monetary incentives to generators who
make investments to improve capacity
and effectively reduce suppliers’ reliance on emission-heavy backup forms
of energy. Rather simply, policymakers
can set new capacity standards. The
hypothetical (or real) cost of carbon
between a generator’s current capacity
and a new capacity standard could be
offered as a subsidy alongside current
feed-in tariffs to reward a generator
for ensuring renewable energy supply
(see Figure 2). If the feed-in tariffs
currently in practice incent increased
renewable investment, then an additional subsidy could reward (primarily
large) generators for better management and mitigation of intermittency.
Such an incentive could induce generators to invest in multiple renewable
sources (instead of only one, as most
currently do), as well as to invest in
scalable storage technology, and it
could place an emphasis for the first
time on strategically designing and
implementing new plants, with an eye
towards counter-balancing renewable
energy sources.

CONCLUSION
Although increasing the price of carbon emissions does lead to lower total
emissions, this policy is not a universally good way to promote investment
in renewables. Moreover, market liberalization may not promote efficient
investment in generation capacity.
Liberalization leads to an increase in
total emissions from the generation
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FIGURE 2 MONETARY INCENTIVE FOR REDUCING INTERMITTENCY
The Energy Portfolio of a Large Supplier
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portfolio, and for a reasonable range
of carbon prices it leads to a lower
share of renewables than in a scenario

where all electricity generators are
vertically integrated. The root cause of
these effects is the interaction between

6

intermittency and market pricing.
Long-term electricity contracts do
ameliorate some disadvantages of the
liberalized markets. Namely, they lead
to a significant increase in renewable
capacity investment while not appreciably affecting nonrenewable capacities. In this way, long-term contracts
with renewable generators increase
the total installed capacity and reduce
emissions relative to the case of
unrestricted market competition. But
since firms likely will not reintegrate,
additional monetary incentives may be
required to reduce renewable energy
intermittency and spur greater investment in new renewable capacity.
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